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~ITUATION III 
BOYCOTT 
States X and Y are using force against each other but 
haYe n1ade no declaration of war. States A, B, and (j 
agree severally ·and jointly to boycott both X and Y 
until they cease to use force. The boycott has been pro-
claiined but no detailed instructions have been given to 
the navies. 
(a) A cruiser of state A, the Ajax, meets a merchant 
"essel of state B, the Banner, apparently bound for a 
port of X. What should the Ajax do~ Would it make 
any difference if the Banner had sailed before the boy-
cott was proclaimed~ "\Vould a cruiser of B, the Brook, 
act in the same manner? 
(b) A cruiser of state C, the Crown, meets a merchant 
vessel of state X bound for state B. What action may 
jt take~ 
(c) The Crown later meets a Inerchant vessel of state 
D, the Drone, bound for state X. What action may the 
Crown take? 
(d) What action may the cruisers of states A, B, and 
C take against a vessel of war of state X convoying 
merchant vessels of X, or convoying merchant vessels 
0f states D, E, and F? 
SoLUTION III 
(a) The Ajax should determine for what port the Ban-
ner is bound and if for a port of X or if uncertain, should 
send the Banner to the nearest port of A, B, or C. 
If the Banner had sailed before the boycott was pro-
claimed, the Banner should be notified of the boycott and 
should be prohibited from entering any port of X. 
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The Brook should act in the same manner unless for 
special reasons the Banner should be ·sent to a port o£ B. 
(b) The Crown should take such action as 'vould make 
certain that the 1nerchant vessel o£ X goes to a port o£ 
B or some port o£ A or C. 
(c) rrhe Crown, i£ assured o£ the nationality o£ the 
Drone, 1nay take no action though the Drone may be kept -
£ron1 entering ports o£ X 'vhich are effectively closed. 
(d) ~1erchant vessels o£ X or D, E and F bound out 
£ron1 X under convoy o£ vessel o£ war o£ X are free to 
proceed but when bound £or X the cruisers o£ states A, 
B, and C may take action to prevent entrance o£ the 
vessels to ports which are effectively closed and may 
route or take vessels o£ X bound £or X to ports o£ A, B, 
and C. 
NOTES 
Defining war.-W ar is an ancient n1ethod o£ settling 
differences. Accounts o£ wars are a1nong the earliest 
records o£ human relations. vVars o£ exter1nination were 
even approved in some o£ the early sacred books and the 
deeds o£ great warriors became the bases for much o£ 
classic literature in most languages. ~fonuments to war-
riors appear in many cities and streets, and squares per-
petuate their In·einories. Significant o£ a marked change 
in attitude is the tribute o£ general recognition given 
since 1918 to the "unkno,vn soldier " in contrast with 
earlier practice o£ laudation o£ leaders whose names £or 
various reasons had become 'vell kno,vn. 
With the changing attitude to,vard war, there came at· 
tempts to regulate the conduct o£ w.ar and to fix its limits. 
The limitation to which the concept o£ war had co1ne 
among advanced thinkers toward the end o£ the sixteenth 
century is indicated in the definition o£ · Gentilis ( 1588) 
in which he said" war is a properly conducted contest of 
armed public forces." (De jure belli, Bk. 1, c. 2.) 
Ayala in 1581 had asserted as a £act that there 'vas not 
safety "in arms without law and discipline any more 
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than in la "r 'vi thout arms " (Westlake, translation, vol. 
II, p. V) not endorsing the :formula " in time of war 
laws are silent." In succeeding centuries treatises upon 
the. la 'vs of war were .common and it was recognized as 
an action "to which, ·£rom the nature of the_ thing and 
the absence of any common superior tribunal, nations 
are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and 
vindicate their rights." (3 Phillimore, International 
Law, p. 49.) 
'Vi th the gro,vth of states and the increasing burden 
of war, rules for its conduct became more and more de-
fined, and the demands of states, not concerned that they 
should so far as possible be free of the consequence of 
hostilities, further restricted action of belligerents. 
'rhe Hague Peace Conference of 1899, called on the 
initiative of the Czar of Russia, had in its agenda pro-
posals for limitation of armament and for the regulation 
of the conduct of war. The Second Peace Conference at 
'The Hague in 1907 elaborated the convention of 1899 in 
regard to 'var. The third convention of the Conference 
of 1907 " considering that it is important in order to en-
sure the maintenance of pacific relations, that hostilities 
should not commence without previous warning" and 
that " a state of war should be notified without delay to 
neutral po,vers ", specifically recognized that hostilities 
between the signatories must not commen~e " Without 
previous and explicit warning ", and that the existence 
of a state of war should not take effect as regards neu-
trals " until after the receipt of notification " unless it is 
"clearly established that th~y were in fact aware of the 
existence of a state of war." 
Definite and explicit notifications were made during 
the World War, so1ne of these even specified the day, 
hour, and minute at which the state of war would exist. 
Provisions 'vere made as to the time when the state of 
w·ar sho_uld be· regarded as at an end. 'rhus it was evi-
dent tha~ the previous uncertainty as to the period of 
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host.iliti(~s 'vas no longer a question giving rise to difficul-
ties such as had previously been common. The com-
lnencenleilt 'vas to be determined by declaration and not, 
ns had sometimes been the case, and would be the case 
under the definition of Gentilis, by the actual "contest 
of the ar1ned public forces", but by the declaration stat· 
jng the HlOinent 'vhen such ··contest might be regarded as 
]awful and 'vhen a state of 'var would be considered as 
t-xisting-. 1"'he i1nplication 'vas that lawful hostilities 
he.twtE~en states parties to the convention " should not 
cotnmcnce without previous 'varning '' as outlined. 
War n tj ght, therefore~ be defined after 1907 as " the 
Telation which exists betw·een states or between political 
t-ntit.ies when there 1nay la,vfully be what Gentilis in 
1588 defined as ' a properly conducted contest of armed 
pubhc forces.'" (V\Tilson and Tucker, International 
L~nv, 8th ed., p. 235.) 
JJeas1t:res short of wrar.-That states should have no 
rEffercnees 'vhich could not be settled by diplomatic 
negotiation see1ns beyond i1nn1ediate hope of realization. 
][n addition to arbitration and judicial methods, for many 
years n1cnsures of reprisal, embargo, nonintercourse, dis-
play or restricted use of force, and pacific blockade have 
been nsecl and ha Ye been regarded as short of war, even 
though someti1nes called nonan1icable. Such measures of 
force or other pressure 'vere often resorted to, particu-
Jarly fro1n the early days of the nineteenth century. 
~Ieas1n·es short of 'var n1ight be used by a neutral to-
\Yard one or both belligerents when the neutral con-
sidered snch 1neasures essential to securing. fair treat-
nl.ent. 
Dlu·j 11g the 'Vorld \V ar by Act of Congress, Septe1nber 
8. 1916. the President of the United States 'vas "au-
thorized and empo\vered to 'vithhold clearance " from 
vessels of a belligerent country denying American vessels 
or citizens " reciprocal liberty of commerce and equal 
Ebert.y of trade." (39 U.S.Stat., p. 88, § 806.) An Act 
of 1887 had en1 po,vered the President to deny entrance 
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to the waters of the United States of Canadian vessels in 
case the rights of A1nerican fishermen were denied or 
abridged in' Canadian "·aters. ( 24 U.S.Stat., p. 475.} 
'fhe Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts of the early 
nineteenth century did not produce the anticipated 
results. 
The granting of " days of grace " for loading and de-
parture of merchant vessels at the outbreak of war was 
common in the World War though o'ving to ·different 
circumstances was not an invariable practice. 
The display of force has also been common as em-
phasizing the position which a state may be urging or 
as giving weight to a request for prompt action in a 
matter which one state has brought to the attention of 
another state. The display of force may even carry an 
intimation that it may be used to ensure respect for the 
rights of a state. During the disturbed conditions in 
Turkey in 1895 the United States :felt the need of such 
support for its minister. 
The efforts of the minister have had the moral support of the 
presence of naval vessels of the United States on the. Syrian 
and Adanan coasts from time to time as occasion required, and 
at the present time the San Francisco and Marblehead are about 
to be joined by the Minneapolis, which has lately been ordered 
to the eastern waters of the 1\Iediterranean. (1895, Foreign Rela-
tions, U.S., p. 1257.) 
Convention on Contract Debts, 1907.-The use of force 
in Venezuela to hasten the payment of claims of foreign 
nationals in 1902 emphasized the growing objection of 
so1ne A1nerican states to this procedure. This objection 
had been embodied in the so-called "Drago Doctrine.',. 
The 1natter came before the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence, 1907, and resulted in the Convention Respecting the 
Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recov-
ery ?f Contract Debts, which provided : 
ARTICLE I. The Contracting Pc;>wers agree not to have recourse 
to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from 
l the Government of one country by· the Government of another· 
couutry as being due to its nationals. 
94 BOYCOTT 
This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor 
State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, 
after accepting the offer, prevents any "Compromis" from being 
agreed on, or, afte-r the arbitration, fails to submit to the award. 
(1908, Naval War College, International Law Situations, p. 166.) 
'The distinction between the use of force and war was 
clearly recognized in the Conference and this agreement 
\vas made with the purpose of specifically restricting the 
use of force. 
Requests for a display of force in China were made 
\\·hen the diplomatic representatives feared an outbreak 
in 1900 and force was used without resort to war after 
the Boxer movement endangered the safety of foreigners. 
'The display of force in 1902 by European powers to 
l1asten Venezuelan action upon debts due their nationals 
"\Yas follo,ved by the use of force . which the European 
po\Yers contended 'vas not war but which resolved into 
\Yar. In the payment of debts by Venezuela as a result 
of this action, preferential treatment was given to the 
po,yers which had used force. (Venezuelan Arbitration, 
Penfield's Report, 1903, p. 110.) The use of force as 
\Yell as the war measures in this case was for the single 
purpose of securing payment of the debts and not for a 
general 'Yar object. 
Oonsequ~ences of pacifio blockade.-Some act resem-
b1 ing pacific blockade has been generally regarded , as 
one of the methods for bringing an offending . state to 
ter1ns 'Yithout resort to war. Pacific blockade has the 
support of long practice and of a large majority of 
~~.nthorities, particularly since the support given to this 
ior1n of action in the resolutions of the Institut de Droit 
International in 1887. In general, the establishing of a 
jpacific blockade is usually approved on the ground that 
it 1nay make resort to war less probable, and thus limit 
the range of possible use of force. 
In its effects as between the state or states establish-
ing the pacific blockade and the state or states under the 
blockade, the blockade may close the blockaded areas to 
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co1nmunication so far as it is effectively maintained and 
measures lawful for 1naintenance of a war blockade n1ay 
be taken to this end. As the effects of the pacific block-
ade should, so far as possible, be confined to the parties 
concerned, third parties as well as their vessels and goods 
should be interfered with only as necessary for the 
physical 1naintenance of the pacific blockade. This is 
also evident from the fact that there are no prize courts 
to pass upon rights. It may be necessary that the block-
ading forces approach, 'vithin the specific area of effec-
tive maintenance of the blockade, vessels of third states 
for the purpose of verification of their right to fly the 
flag. l'he blockading force may take such n1easures as 
are necessary for closing the port before which it is 
Inaintaining an effective blockade. Though it n1ay not 
take vessels of third states as prize, it may prevent their 
entrance; and for such detention the blockading state as-
sumes no liability, though notice must be given the vessel 
of the third state at the line of blockade or in an un-
questionable 1nanner. 'T essels of third states must also be 
granted reasonable time to load and depart from a port 
under pacific blockade. 
Block(J)de of Buenos Ayres, 1838.-The declarations by 
'v hich some of the blockades of the nineteenth century 
'vere established were not unifmm. On March 28, 1838, 
a circular containing the following paragraph referring 
to the blockade of the port of Buenos Ayres a-nd the 
Argentine coast 'vas transmitted to the foreign diplo-
matic and consular representatives. by the French 
Government : 
Je vous prie done, ~Ionsieur, d'informer Yotre Govenunent de 
cette mesure, et de faire connaitre en n1eme te1ns qu'il sera pris 
contre les btitin1ens qui chercherainet a entrer dans les Ports 
bloques, apres avoir recu la signification du blocus par run des 
btitimens de guerre Francais, les mesures de rigueur autorisees 
par les Lois des Nations. (26 [1837-38] British and Foreign 
State Papers, p. 973.) 
Days of .grace for ei1trance and departure till ~fay 10 
were granted. 
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Le Oomte de Thomar, 1848.-The Brazilian vessel Le 
Oomte de Thomar had been before a prize commission 
established at Montevideo at the time of the so-called 
blockade of the la Plata. The vessel had been released, 
but war material in its cargo had been condemned by this 
prize commission, August 6, 1846. The case was subse-
quently brought before the French Conseil d'Etat, which 
reviewed the case and declared : 
Considerant que, par Ia decision ci-dessus visee, Ia commission 
des prises, en ordonnant Ia restitution du navire le Oomte de 
Thomar et des marchandises trouvees A bord, a n~anmoins declar~ 
valide Ia prise de 686 barils de poudre et de 50 quintaux de plomb 
en barre; 
Considerant que, si les regles et Ia pratique constante du droit 
maritime autorisent Ia saisie sur un navire neutre des objets de 
cette nature, qualifies de contrebade de guerre, c'est dans le cas 
seulement ou le batiment capteur appartient a une puissance 
belligeran te ; 
Considerant que, qu'il resulte de Ia lettre du ministre des af-
faires etrangeres que, nonobstant le blocus des cotes de Ia repu-
blique argentine, le gouvernement fran~ais n'etait pas en etat de 
guerre avec ladite republique. 
ART. ler. Est declaree non valide Ia prise des barils de poudre 
et des plombs en barre trouves a bord du navire bresilien le 
Gomte de Thomar. (I Pistoye & Duverdy, p. 390.) 
This decision is followed by this brief comment: 
. " 
Observations.-Nous comprenons qu'un Etat qui bloque un port, 
sans1.faire la grande guerre, permette le·· transport des armes et 
munitions pour le port bloque. L'arret ci-dessus nous parait un 
acte de munificence et de liberalite, bien plus qu'un acte juridique. 
(Ibid.) 
Cartagena, 1885.-At the time of domestic disturbance 
in Colombia in 1885 when other states were at peace, Mr. 
Bayard, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Whitney, Sec-
retary of the Navy, of protection of nationals and their 
property. He said: 
At Cartagena, as at any other point in Colombia, not on the 
direct line of isthmian transit, the only question presented for 
our consideration is the general one of the protection of the 
liYes and property of citizens of the United States established 
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there. Our right in this respect is of course neither more nor 
less than that of any other government whose citizens or subjects 
may be found at such points under similar circumstances. Inter-
ests of other nationalities than our own are understood to exist 
at Cartagena. Consequently no measure could be taken by forces 
of the United States for the protection of their citizens there1 
'~hich we would not admit the perfect right of another govern-
ment-that of England, France, or Germany, for instance-to em-
ploy for the like protection of its subjects. * * * But where 
the place of their sojourn is a port open to the world's commerce~ 
to which foreign vessels have a right to resort, the presence of 
war vessels of their nation is proper to protect the national 
shipping in port and the lives and property of neutral citizens 
on shore, from any injurious treatment contrary to the received 
interna tiona! rules of warfare. Such war vessels may properly 
afford asylum to our own noncombatant citizens and normnl pro·-
tection to their interests within tbe limits of legitimate waiCfare~ 
and extreme cases may be conceived where the supreme law or 
self-preservation may require more effective measures if the 
bounds of legitimate warfare be overpassed. In no event, how-
ever, should such measures amount to an intervention in the 
df•mestic distgrbances of that country by aiding one belligerent 
against the other. (6 Moore, International Law Digest, P~ 29.) 
Greece, 1897.-The so-called pacific blockade of Greece 
in 1897 is one in regard to which the United States took 
a positive position. 
On February 10 the British Government sent to its 
representatives in ··Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, the following tele-
graphic dispatch: 
The French Ambassador has suggested to me, and I ha V<~ 
ugreed, that instructions should be sent to our Naval Commanders 
in Cretan waters to concert, in case of need, with . the Naval 
Commanders of the other Great Powers for preventing the· Greek 
ships of war from taking any aggressive action, and for ta!png 
such measures as seem to be required by the circumstances which 
may arise. (90 British and Foreign States Papers, 1897-1898r 
p. 1299.) 
-;.On the next day the British Admiralty telegraphed to 
its naval commander in Greek waters that 
It has been suggested_ by the French Government that thr3 
British and French Naval Comm~nders in Cretan waters should 
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concert together, and with those of other Powers in case of 
necessity, to prevent any aggressive action of the Greek ships of 
war sent to Crete, and, generally speaking, for the adoption of 
any measures which circumstances may render expedient. The 
concurrence of Her Majesty's Government has been given. In-
struct the Senior Naval Officer at Crete accordingly. (Ibid., 
p. 1300.) 
The German authorities favoring action by the Powers, 
mentioned that 
Not only should aggressiYe action on the part of the Greek 
ships be prevented, but any action which might encourage the 
revolution, and the very fact of their presence in Cretan waters 
was calculated to encourage it. In His Excellency's opinion, 
therefore, it 'vould be necessary to give considerable latitude to 
the Naval Commanders as to the manner in which they should 
deal with the Greek ships of war, and to authorize them, if they 
sh9uld d·eem it necessary, to drive the1n away from Cretan waters. 
(Ibid., p. 1313.) 
On February ~6, 1897, the British Govern1nent sent to 
its admiral in Cretan waters instructions to the following 
effect: 
You have authority to take any steps in conjunction with the 
other Naval Commanders, 'vhich may be agreed upon by the Ad-
mirals in Council, for the purpose of preventing aggressive action 
on the part of the Greeks. (Ibid., p. 1316.) ' 
In accord with these instructions certain acts had been 
approved as was stated in a Foreign Office communica-: 
tion of February 18, 1897: 
The Russian Ambassador stated to-day that, at the request of 
the Ottoman Government, Admiral ·Andreeff, the Russian Naval 
Commander in Cretan waters, had been authorized .t9 prevent 
Greek ships of war from interfering with the transport of TUrk-
ish troops between various points of the Cretan coast, and also to 
occupy by common accord certain other places on the coast, espe-
cially Candia, Rethymo, Sitia, Kissamo, and Selino. 
The instructions given to the British Admiral will enable him to 
take part in any measures of this nature which the Naval Com-
manders of the other Powers may agree. (91 British and Foreign 
State Papers, 1898-1899, p. 132.) 
· About this time a. joint blockade of Greek ports was 
proposed, but the Great Powers were faced with the prob-
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letn of detern1ining the status of Crete to which they 
had sent forces and some of the powers 'vere in favor of 
the continuance of the status quo. 
The British Embassy in Berlin reported that the 
GernUtn Emperor frowned upon the annexation of Crete 
by Greece. As "the Great Po,vers had prevented the 
Sultan from sending troops to Crete ", they were under 
'" 1noral obligation of preventing the Greeks fro1n annex-
ing the island. * * * If the Great Powers allowed 
the1nsel ves to be defied by Greece, not only would they 
n1ake themselves ridiculous but they 'vould make them-
selves responsible for the consequences, which would 
probably be a general war. For his part, His Majesty 
could not agree to sanction such lamentable weakness on 
the part of the Powers, and he would withdraw his flag 
from the Mediterranean. I ventured to observe that this 
would bring the European concert to an end, to which 
His Majesty replied that it did not deserve to exist if it 
allo,ved its decisions to be overruled by Greece." (Ibid, 
p. 137). l\fany notes 'vere exchanged among the Great 
Powers and the plan was advanced to make Crete a 
privileged province 'vith special relations to Greece al-
though it 1night remain a part of the 1'urkish Empire. 
The British Government informed the cooperating 
po\Yers on February 24, 1897, of the policy which they 
considered as according to their view: 
1. That the establishment of adn1inistrative autonomy in Crete 
is, in their judgtnent, a neces·sary condition to the termination of 
the international occupation. 
2. That, subject to the above provision, Crete ought, in their 
judgment, to remain a portion of the Turkish Empire. 
3. That Turkey and Greece ought to be informed by the Powers 
of this resolution. 
4. That if either Turkey or Greece persistently refuse ,vhen 
required to withdraw their naval and military forces from the 
island, the Powers should impose their decision by force upon the 
State so refusing. (Ibid., p. 147.) 
Objection was raised to point 4 on the ground that 
.9~.~-~f.e a~d ';rurkey should not be subject to identic treat-
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m<~nt as Turkish forces were lawfully in Crete while 
Greek forces were not~ On March 20, 1897, the following 
p:rocJ amation signed by the ambassadors of the six 
powers 'vas issued to the United States. 
j[1be Undersigned, under instructions from their respective 
Governments, have the honor to notify the Government of the 
Uniite<l States that the admirals in command of the torces of 
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and 
R.ussia in Cretan waters have decided to put the Island of Crete 
h.] a state of blockade, commencing the 21st instant at 8 a.m. 
The blockade will be general for all ships under the Greek flag. 
Ships of the six powers or neutral powers may enter into the 
:ports occupied by the powers and land their merchandise, but 
only if it is not for the Greek troops or the interior of the island. 
~he ships may be visited by the ships of the international fleets. 
The limits of the blockade are comprised between 23°24' and 
26°30' longitude east of Greenwich, and 35°48' and 34°45' north 
Jatitude. (1897, Foreign Relations U.S., p. 254.) 
Joint blockade, 1913.-The officers in command of the 
British, Austro-Hungarian, French, German, and Italian 
naval forces notified a blockade as in force from 8 a.m. 
April 10, 1913, of the Adriatic coast from Antivari to 
the n1outh of the River Dvin. This blockade was ex-
tended to Durazzo from 6 a.m., April 23 and was raised 
~rrom 2 p.m., May 14, 1913. 
In reply to a question in the House of Commons, April 
7~ 1913, Sir Edward Grey had said that certain British 
vessels 1vere proceeding to the coast of Montenegro to 
ta.ke part in a naval demonstration " 'vith the .above 
10amed states." He offered the following explanation: 
We are party to it because we are a party with the other 
Great Powers to an agreement which the naval demonstration is 
]ntended t o uphold. This agreement is that there should be 
an autonomous Albania. We willingly became a party to this, for 
the Albanians are separate in race, in language, and to a great 
-extent in religion. The war which is proceeding against them has 
long ceased to haYe any bearing on the war between Turkey and 
the Allies, or to be a war of liberation. The operations of Monte-
negro against Scutari are part of a war of conquest, and there 
:is no reason why the sa1ne sympathy that \Vas felt for l\fontenegro 
or Ctther count ries contending for liberty and national existence 
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should not be extended to the Albanian population of Scutari and 
its district, who are mainly Catholics and l\1oslem, and who are 
contending for their lands, their religion;· their language, and 
their lives. (LI Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1913, p. 816.) 
Sir Edward Grey further 1naintained that the agree1nent 
'vas essential to the peace of Europe and should be upheld 
by international action. 
Blockade of Greece, 1916.-The blockade of Greece by 
the Allies in 1916, declared to be in effect from Decemoer 
8, 8 a.m., allo,ved a period of 48 hours for the departure 
of "vessels of third po,vers " from Greek harbors. Pro-
t€st against this blockade 'vas made by Greek officials as 
co~trary to international law on the ground that peaceful 
relations existed bet,veen Greece and the Allies. 
Italian blockade of Fiume, 1920.-1'he French "Jour-
nal officiel de la Republique Francaise " of December 4, 
1920, contained the follo\\"ing notification: 
A la date du 1 cr decembre 1920, le Gouvernement italien a in-
fornle le Gouverne1nent de la Republique de sa decision de tenir 
en etat de blocus effectif par ses forces navales, a partir du 1" 
decembre a 10 heures, la zone cotiere de l'Etat independant de 
Fiume, des iles de Veglia et Arbe et des parages avoisinants. 
Un delai opportun sera laisse pour la sortie des na vires de com-
merce amis. 
This notification does not refer to neutrals but to " amis." 
The blockade of Bulgaria, October 16, 1915, referred 
to " friendly or neutral vessels " as being granted days of 
grace. 
Reprisals.-Early ideas on the doctrine of reprisals, of 
which boycott may be regarded as a phase, appear among 
writers. Theologians of medieval times found little 
difficulty in supporting reprisals by Biblical injunctions. 
A clear distinction between reprisals in war and reprisals 
in peace 'vas not always made. 
The treatise of Bartolus (1313-59) was quite full upon 
t.his. · 
'Tictoria (1480-1546) and others of this period 'vrite 
upon the subject. Grotius refers to the reprisals more 
in relation to war. The words " retorsion ", " reprisal ", 
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"embargo"," nonintercourse" and the like, were not al-
'vays used in senses that could be clearly distinguished. 
Retorsion was usually applied to retaliation· in kind, 
'vhile reprisals aimed to secure redress :for action by 
'vhich a state regarded itself to be injured and the n1eans 
n1ight not be analogous to the injury, but such as the 
offended state might regard as most effective. Two com-
lnercial states might set up by retorsion reciprocal trade 
barriers, while by reprisal one state n1ight bring another 
to recognize privileges through holding its king who 
1night chance to be within its borders. In ancient tin1es 
the limits of reprisals were difficult to determine, though 
there was a growing sense that they should be propor-
tioned to the injury for which remedy was sought. 
Opinions of writers.-Writers upon the topic of pacific 
blockade have shown wide difference of opinion as to 
'vhether it was a }a,vful measure short of war in spite o:f 
the title "pacific." Some have considered it merely a 
lj1nited hostility but lawful; others have regarded it as 
unla,vful; so1ne have regarded it as la"rful only as re-
gards the blockading and blockaded parties; 'vhile still 
others have regarded it as lawful as regards all states and 
short of war. Practice seems to support the opinion that 
pacific blockade is a. lawful measure of constraint short 
of 'var, but operating directly only upon the blockaded 
and blockading states. In several recent pacific block-
ades, however, third states have not protested against 
the application of its provisions deter1nining the nun1-
ber of days of grace allowed to their merchant vessels 
to ·withdraw from the blockaded area. 
The measures undertaken under the name" pacific block-
ade "seem to be recognized generally as lawful when con-
fined to the states concerned. These measures seem to 
be adequately effective only when extended also to third 
states which would at least create a state of quasi war 
and quasi neutrality. There arises, therefore, the old 
question of effectivity of blockade but transferred to 
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pacific blockaue. Under modern conditions of com1nerce 
to be really effective a blockade must be against ships 
1:nder all flags and this degree of constraint is not gen-
erally reeognized .as an ·attribute of pacific blockade. 
Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant i1nplies 
measures .of collective coercion that go beyond pacific 
block9-de in their inclusive nature but, in the application 
of force by individual states for effective use of collectiYe 
force " to protect the covenants of the r~eague "' may be 
more restricted. 
lnstitut de Droit /11.ternational, 1887.-A report was 
1nade to the Institut de Droit International at the meet-
ing in Heidelberg in 1887 upon the right of blockade 
in time of peace. Dr. Perels, "' ho was the adviser of 
the German ad1niralty, made the report. This report 
admits that the pacific blockade is comparatively 1nodern 
but that this does not deny its legality, as develop1nent 
of ne'v relations a1nong states in1plies new n1ethods. 
Discu~sion, 1902.-This Naval War College considered 
certain aspects of pacific blockade in 1902 showing that 
while early practice before the middle of the nineteenth 
century had extended the operation of the blockade to 
third powers, later practice had tended to limit the 
effects of pacific blockade to the parties directly con-
cerned. In the r·esume of the discussion in 1902, it was 
said: 
It would seem from the weight of authorities and from the 
majority of later cases, that pacific blockades should not bear 
upon third states except as they are affected by the constraint 
directly applied to the state blockaded, i.e., the vessels of a third 
state should be entirely free to go and come while such measures 
of constraint as may be decided upon 1nay be applied to the 
blockaded state. 
If the need for interruption of relations between the block-
aded state and third states is sufficiently serious to require the 
seizure of neutral vessels, it would seem to warrant the institu-
tion of a regular blockade involving a state of war. 
If only the mild constraint which is short of war, the block-
ade affecting merely the blockaded state's commerce, is necessary, 
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then pacific blockade, though it works inconvenience, may be legit-
ilnatc. (1902, Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, 
p. 87.) 
It was further said in the conclusions that it was now 
( 1902) the general opinion : 
( 1) That pacific blockade should be exclusively confined to 
those who are parties to it and should not be extended to third 
states. 
( 2) That pacific blockade as a measure short of war does not 
involve any neutrality on the part of those not parties to it. 
( 3) That pacific blockade should be limited as far as possible 
that it may not be confused with belligerent blockade, which is 
definitely outlined. (Ibid., p. 97.) 
A1nerican Institute of International Law1, 1925.-In 
1925 the A1nerican Institute of International La,v pre-
sented a plan for measures of repression enu1nerating 
~ - 1neasures of self-redress short of war." In the list 
are included nonintercourse and pacific blockade. 
\Vhile pacific blockade is regarded in this project as a 
t~se of force, it is not regarded as giving rise to a state 
of ·war though when applied to vessels of third states 
-:.t is considered "in effect an act of war." 
ARTICLE 10. 
PAC'IFIC BLOCKADE. 
Pacific blockade consists in the obstructing or closing of the 
ports or coasts of one country by another. Its purpose is to 
prevent access to or egress from a foreign port or coast---compell-
lng the territorial sovereign to yield to the demands which have 
been made upon the blockaded state. If confined solely to the 
oeountry against which the measure is taken, the act is said to be 
pacific, and it does not necessarily create a state of war. If the 
blockade affects the vessels of other nations, it is in effect an 
:act of war. (20 American Journal, International Law, Sup., 
:i1925, project no. 29, p. 383.) 
Pacific blockade and Article 16.-In a report of May 
17, 1927, of the Secretary General of the League of N a-
tions upon the legal position which would arise in en-
forcing article 16 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations in time of peace, it was said: 
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The question how far the sanctions can lawfully · be carried 
without resort to war is considered below with reference to each 
of the above classes of State. It may be noted here thaf, from 
the legal point of view, the existence of a state of war bet,--veeu 
two States depends upon their intention and not upon the nature 
of their acts. Accordingly, measures of coercion, however drastic~ 
which are not intended to create and are not regarded by thii:! 
State to w~lch they are applied as creating a state of \var, do 
not legnlly establish a relation of war between the states con-
cerned. This would seem to be the case even if, as is ·suggested 
to be possible under point (c) below, third States find it necess:u."y 
to guide their own conduct by the view that a state of war 
exists. There is no general rule of international law under 
which application of the economic sanctions would automa ticaUy 
p1·oduce a state of war. (Reports and Resolutions, League of 
Nations Documents, A. 14. 19'27. V., p. 83.) 
I...~ater it is said : 
It is therefore prudent to conclude that, in applying the e·co-
nomic sanctions of Article 16 without resort to war, the Member~~ 
of the League must fully respect the rights of third Stat(~s. 
(Ibid., p. 86.) 
The hope was expressed, ho,vever, that third sta1tes 
·would adopt a " benevolent attitude " to,vard the Leagflh?J 
policy. 
It was also said in this report that: 
It would not in fact be prudent to attempt to lay down posi· 
tively in advance the measures which the Members of the Leagw~· 
could consider themselves as legally entitled to adopt toward 
third States under the form of a pacific blockade. Not nwrely 
is the existing law uncertain but it is uncertain how far thi.rd. 
States would or would not be disposed to take a narrow view of 
the application of the existing law to the special and unprec~­
dented case of a pacific blockade applied under Article 16 of tbe 
Covenant. The tendency before the war of 1914-18 was t~Jo 
recognize that a pacific blockade imposed in the interests of inter-
national order by a number of Powers had a much higher clain.t 
to be regarded as an institution of international law than a block-
ade enforcing the particular interests of certain Powers, a.ud ·a 
blockade under Article 16 is in the fullest sense one falling within 
the first category. 
It appears to be a legitimate conclusion from the practice and 
doctrine of international law before the war of 1914-18 that a. 
pacific blockade imposed in application of Article 16 of the Cov~-
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nant and observing certain conditions and limits \vould be a meas-
ure the legal validity of which should be recognized by third 
States. To secure such recognition from third States, it would 
seem that the blockade ought to comply with the conditions as 
to notification and effectiveness which apply to a blockade in time 
of war. The blockade \vould give the right not to confiscate but 
to sequestrate ships of the blockaded State ~"'at~empting to break-
through it and their cargoes, the ships and cargoes being ulti-
mately returned without compensation to their owners. It would 
seem, further, that third States would not legally be entitled to 
object to the enforcement of the blockade, with the suggested 
consequences, against ships of 1\Iembers of the League, whether 
applying the sanctions or not, and their cargoes. 
On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether the third State 
would be legally bound to acquie&::e in the enforcement of the 
blockade against its own ships and their cargoes. (Ibid., p. 88.) 
Object of measu1"es short of w-ar and boycott.-The 
object of Ineasures short of war is usually to settle some 
difference in which the parties are directly concerned. 
This is the case in retorsion, reprisals, and retaliation in 
various for1ns. Nonintercourse and embargo decrees 
usually contain some sta.te1nent of injuries for which 
remedy is sought by the state establishing the regulation. 
Pacific blockade as a measure short of war has at times 
been used as a means of remedy for a condition in which 
the parties proclaiming the blockade are only indirectly 
concerned. 
International boycott has been advocated as a means of 
putting pressure upon a state which n1ay be considered 
to have failed to fulfill some international obligation 
which may only remotely con.cern the states engaging in 
the boycott. The boycott is especially aimed to put an 
end to commercial relations with the boycotted state. 
When such boycott is solely a.n act of individuals who 
without any participation or action of the state refrain 
from commercial relations with the nationals of another 
state, the boycott as such has no bearing upon interna-
tional law. A modern state would scarcely expect, with-
out laying itself open to reprisals, to determine with 
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whom or in what its nationals should trade other than by-
general tariff laws and treaties. 
If members of the League of Nations under article 1().. 
prevent " all financial, com1nercial, or personal inter-
course bet,veen the nationals of the covenant-breaking· 
state and the nationals of any other state, 'vhether a mem--
ber of the League or not", then such an act by whatever · 
name it is called, ceases to be a private and becomes a 
public act with international consequences. If the so-
called " covenant-breaking state " is a land-locked state,. 
the action of the other states 'vould partake of the nature 
of a boycott 'vhich the participating states would be un-
der obligations to enforce by appropriate measures. If. 
the covenant-breaking state has a seacoast, the enforce- -
ment of the prevention called for would partake of the · 
nature of 'vhat in earlier days has been called a pacific · 
blockade, a 1neasure 'vhich has often been used by states-
to bring another state to fulfill its obligations or to take · 
certain action. 
While boycott \vas in its early develop1nent an in--
dividual and unofficial action, as in China in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, it gradually took on a po- · 
litical nature and 'vhen it became collective and more or · 
less official, protests w·ere made. The dangers of un-
authorized, individual, or collective action by groups of· 
individuals in retaliation against action of a foreign state 
was recognized. Such action might be based upon in-
correct or partial understanding of the circumstances and 
might involve the state 'vhose nationals engaged in the · 
boycott in serious consequences, making the settlement of · 
a question 1nore difficult. At the same time, boycott was . 
recognized as a. n1easure which might be very potent if 
properly used but unless the state acted directly or in-
directly, the state could not be held responsible for · 
determining whether its nationals discriminated against 
the goods or commerce of a specific state. An unofficial' 
boycott by nationals has extended in some instances not 
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me_rely to goods and commerce but also to persons, lan-
guage, journals, music, etc., of the state against which 
,pr~ssure was aimed. Article 16 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations endorsed the prevention of all inter-
course between the nationals of a covenant-breaking state 
and the nationals of other states, and provided for mu-
tual support, even presuming the use of force, and af-
fording passage through their territory to forces coop-
·erating to protect the covenants of the League. For 
maritime states somewhat similar measures had been 
undertaken for a century in what had come to be known 
as pacific blockade 'vhich aimed at a partial isolation of 
.a state while article 16 aimed at complete isolation. 
Some have maintained that article 16 conte1nplates <11 
resort to war on the part of the covenant-breaking state 
against which the other n1embe~s of the League under-
take only such measures as will isolate the offender. 
Others have maintained that an act of war having taken 
place, a state of war exists, and the consequences are 
limited only by the laws of 'var and neutrality. Para-
graph 2, of article 16, seems to give the council authority 
to recommend such use of armed forces as may be needed 
to protect the covenants of the League 'vithout neces-
sarily creating a state of war in the technical sense but 
authorizing the use of force to protect the covenant. 
The provisions of article 16 would not be necessarily 
.applicable to a state of war but to a condition of isola-
tion consequent upon a disregard of its covenants. Of 
course this article 16 was drawn with the expectation 
that all the more powerful states 'vould be members of 
the League under which conditions its application would 
be more simple. 
Chinese boyaott, 1905.-"fhe termination of the treaty 
of 1894 between the United States and China after its 
10-year period in 1904, made it desirable to negotiate a 
new treaty. Rumors spread in China that its terms were 
to be detrimental to China and it was urged that the 
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people should sho"\v their opposition by b_oycotting after 
August 1, 1904, "all American schools, business, goods, 
products, and ships unless the ~exclusion treaty guaran-
teed· equitable treatment to travelers, students, and mer-
chants entering the United States." Minister Rockhill, 
long fainiliar 'vith oriental diplonlacy, found much to 
confirm his opinion that the boycott was " "\Vith official 
Hpproval i£ not actually at official suggestion." The 
governmental encouragement seems evident from notices 
and proclamations. 
The Chinese Government was notified in early August, 
1905, that under early treaties the United States would 
1~.old China " responsible for any loss sustained by the 
.A.merican trade on account of any failure on the part 
of China to stop the present organized movement against 
the United States." (1905 Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 
212.) Later the Chinese Government informed Minister 
Rockhill that the Government assumed no responsibility 
a~ the 1novement 'vas started by the traders. 
Boycott of Danzig.-Owing to differences of various 
kinds with the Polish Government accusations were 
made that Danzig had suffered by measures taken in 
Poland against the Free City. A report by the Govern-
ment of the Free City of Danzig, August 14, 1931, says: 
A particularly serious difficulty in the relations between Danzig 
and Poland is due to the economic injury suffered by the Free 
City as the result of measures taken by the Polish Government. 
Unfortunately no alleviation or improvement has been percepti-
ble in this respect since the session of the Council in May. An 
impression has, on the contrary, been created in the Danzig 
population that the Polish Government, by its economic meas-
ures against Danzig, has been deliberately aiming at injuring the 
trade and industry of Danzig and at the same time at weakening, 
in this way, the resistance of the Danzig population to Polish 
political aims. It is inco~prehensible, otherwise, that the Polish 
Government, which, in view of the Customs and economic union, 
has it in its power to grant Danzig all kinds of economic facil-
ities, should bluntly reject all suggestions of the Danzig Govern-
ment to this effect, and shoul.d on the contrary keep contriving 
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new measures which are bound seriously to injure Danzig's trade 
and industry. The repeated attempts of Danzig-more par-
ticularly through the commercial senator-to bring about an ex-
change of views on all questions still pending have proved 
abortive. Poland has made no use of this ()pportunity, but -._bas, 
without -any real grounds, .postponed negotiations indefinitely, 
especially on the subject of the exceptional importation of 
specific goods, of so-called quotas, which are indispensa-
ble for the economic life of Danzig. The Danzig Chamber 
of Commerce has exerted itself in the same direction as the Dan-
zig· Government. As evidence may be mentioned the fact that it 
not long ago issued a warning in a public proclamation not to 
reply to the extensive boycotting of Danzig goods in Polish cir-
cles by a counter boycott of Polish goods in Danzig. Economic 
co-operation, as provided for in the treaties, is a preliminary con-
dition for regular political relations between Danzig and Poland. 
The unjust exclusion of Danzig trade from the Polish hinterland, 
the confiscation of Danzig goods in Poland-contrary to the spirit 
of the treaties--the steady increase in the boycotting movement, 
are bound to create in the particular circles affected in Danzig 
a state of discontent which lnay have most serious consequences. 
If normal relations are to be established between the two States, 
dependent upon one another as the result of the treaties, it is 
essential first and foren1ost to eliminate the economic pressure 
still brought to bear by Poland on Danzig. (Access to, or anchor-
age in, the port of Danzig of Polish war vessels. Permanent 
Court of International Justice, Series 0, No. 55, p. 36.) 
Committee on Boycotts and Peace, 1932.-In 1931 the 
Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund entrusted to 
a committee the drawing up of a report on Economic 
Sanctions for the Pact of Paris. In the report of this 
committee, March 2, 1932, the following was mentioned 
as the crucial question to 'vhich the committee was giving 
attention. 
What shall be the attitude and the policy of the other powers 
signatory to the Pact of Paris, if one or more of their number, 
failing to conform to the pledge given in the Pact, do begin or 
threaten hostilities? 
The Con1mittee on Econmnic Sanctions is of opinion that the 
time has now fully come for the powers signatory to the Pact of 
Paris to declare, in answer to this question, what, under such 
circumstances, will be their policy. 
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In the present state of world opinion, it is highly probable that 
no people whose government is signatory to the Pact of Paris 
will desire the use of their government's military and naval force's 
in the settlement of international quarrels arising elsewhere in 
the world. Nevertheless, a clear and definite violation of the 
pledges given in the Pact of Paris may easily lead to another 
world-wide armed conflict, this time finally and fatally disastrous 
in its effects. 
The Committee accordingly suggest that the signatories of the 
Pact of Paris should enter into au appropriat(\ protocol or agree-
nlent supplemental to that Pact whereby they will engage them-
selves, in the event of hostilitie·s, actual or threatened, promptly 
to consult together with a view to determine upon measures of 
nonintercourse which would be appropriate to prevent the threat-
ened breach of the Pact, or if it could not be prevented, to end 
hostilities and to restore the status existing prior to the breach. 
A1nong the measures of nonintercourse which could be applied 
would be: 
(1) A cessation of any shipment of arms or munition·s or other 
absolute contraband; 
(2) Such further economic sanctions and concerted measures, 
short of the use of force, as may be determined to be appropriate 
and practical under the circum·stances of any given case. (Boy-
cotts and Peace, E. Clark, editor, p. 7.) 
The nonintercours(l measures proposed are those short 
uf the use of force. There are many grounds :for believ-
ing that the states o:f the world do not yet regard such 
measures as sufficing :for their security. 
lJ! easures of constraint.-Even before the vV or ld War 
there "\vas a gro,ving interest in the . settle1nent of differ-
ences bet,Yeen states ''ithout resort to 'var. In early 
tiines there 'vas resort to n1easures of restraint upon con1-
lnercial intercourse bet,veen states in order to bring one 
state to accept the terms proposed by another or in order 
to check certain actions. 
It 'vas maintained that a state might control its own 
territories and determine at will what passed its :fron-
tiers. It was sometime stated that tariff acts 'vere an 
evidence of the right of a state to control commerce. 
The reply to this "\Vas that tariff acts 'vere of general ap-
plication while these other 1neasures 'vere aimed at a 
sjngle state. 
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Whenever nationals of one state of their O\Vn volition 
assuine an attitude \Vhich limits or puts an end to their 
relations with the nationals of another state, this atti-
tude was regarded before 1914 as beyond state control 
and as an act for which a state could disclaim all re-
sponsibility even though injury to the commerce or other 
injury n1ight be suffered. If a state encouraged or offi-
cially participated in this attitude, then there might be 
ground for international complaint on the part of a 
friendly state. 
Peace conferences as at Berne, 1892; Budapest, 1896; 
Paris, 1900; l\1ilan, 1906; and Geneva, 1912, had pro-
posed measures for making effective the awards of inter-
national tribunals. Among the measures suggested 
\vhich received particular support was the prohibition 
of econo1nic relations with a recalcitrant state. Some 
peace conferences arrived at the conclusion that mere 
agitation for the spread of good will would not attain the 
hoped-for peace a1nong states, and that states should be 
1nade to realize that peace was essential to national 
progress and preferable to war. To this end these con-
ferences proposed measures which would result in eco-
nomic isolation of states not fulfilling their international 
obligations. 
The Tampico incident, 1914.-In 1914 while there was 
a disturbed condition of affairs in Mexico, an event at 
~Tampico gave rise to various complications. The event 
jg thus set forth by the American Admiral Mayo in a 
communication to the Mexican co1nmanding officer of the 
liuertista forces. resisting the constitutionalists ashore: 
This morning an officer and squad of men of the Mexican mili-
tary forces arrested and marched through the street of Tampico 
a commissioned officer of the United States Navy, the paymaster 
of the U.S.S. Dolphin, together with seven men composing the 
crew of the whaleboat of the Dolphin. 
At the time of this arrest the officer and 1nen concerned 'vere 
unarmed and engaged in loading cases of gasoline which had been 
vurchased o~ shore. Part of these men were on the shore, but 
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all, including the man or men in the boat, were forced to accom-
pany the armed Mexican force. 
I do not need to tell you that taldng men from a boa.t flying 
the American flag· is a hostile act not to be excused. 
I have already received your verbal message of regret that this: 
eYent had happened, and your statement that it was committed 
by an ignorant officer. 
The responsibility for hostile acts cannot be avoided by the-
plea of ignorance. 
In view of the publicity of this occurrence, I must require-
that you send 1ne, by suitable members of your staff, formal dis-
avowal of and apology for the act, together with your assurance 
that the officer responsible for it will receive severe punishment. 
Also that you publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent 
position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute 
will be duly returned by this ship. 
Your answer to this communication, should reach me and the-
called-for salute be fired within twenty-four hours from 6 p.m. 
of this date. 
MAYO. 
(1914, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 448.) 
An apology 'vas offered but the salute to the flag was 
not rendered and at length President Wilson on April 
20, addressed Congress. Setting forth the grave situa-
tion in Mexico, he said : 
I, therefore, come to ask your approval that I should use the-
armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an 
extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and 
his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of 
the United States, even amidst the distressing conditions now 
unhappily obtaining in Mexico. 
There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of-
selfish aggrandizement .. 'Ve seek to maintain the dignity and 
authority of the United States only because we wish always to· 
keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both 
in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for 
the benefit of mankind. (Ibid., p. 4 76.) 
The address resulted in the following action : 
In view of the facts presented by the President of the United 
States in his address delivered to the Congress in joint session on 
the twentieth day of April, nineteen hundred and fourteen, with 
regard to certain affronts and indignities committed against the-
United States in Mexico: Be it 
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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assentbled, That the Presi-
·dent is justified in the employ1nent of the ar1ned forces of the 
United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal :unentls for 
certain affronts and indignities committed against the United 
States. 
Be it further resozv,ed, That the United States disclaims any 
hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon 
_Mexico. 
Approved, April 22, 1914. (38 U.S. Statutes, p. 770.) 
In communicating this action to American diplomatic 
representatives abroad on April 23, 1914, Secretary 
Bryan said: 
Please note that the word "justified" is used instead of " au-
thorized." This was done to emphasize the fact that the resolu-
tion is not a declaration of war but contemplates only the specific 
redress of a specific indignity. 
Admiral Fletcher has taken possession of custom-house at Vera 
Cruz. No resistance at time, but later battery and scattered 
forces fired on Americans, which was returned. Four Americans 
killed, twenty wounded. Loss on Mexican side not known; esti-
Inated 150. (1914, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 483.) 
Argentine, Brazil, and Chile offered good offices, which 
were accepted, and the mediators 'vere to asse1nble at 
Niagara Falls, May 18. So far as possible it was hoped 
that the stattbS quo would not be changed. After much 
negotiation, on November 20, 1914, the Acting Secretary 
--of War telegraphed to General Funston, of the occupy-
ing forces at Vera Cruz : 
You will evacuate Vera Cruz on 1\Ionday, Noven1ber 23d. You 
will bring with you to the United States all funds. in your pos-
session frmn whatever source derived, both United States funds 
and Mexican customs, receipts and taxes. You will also bring 
with you all the records, accounts, and money papers necessary 
to establish the integrity and accuracy of your financial and other 
administration. You will make an inventory of all goods in the 
customs house keeping the original thereof and leaving a copy 
with Consul Canada. You may also leave with Consul Canada 
such copies of accounts or other data as may be required by 
·whmnsoever 1nay continue the govern1nent of the city. Do not 
make any arrangements with local :Mexicans or with l\Iexican 
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representatiYes from outside the city that could make it seem,, 
that you are recognizing the right of Carranza to jurisdiction over 
the city. It is merely desired that you get out in the best prac-
tical fashion, leaving things in as good shape as possible and 
making no declaration that could be interpreted as committing ·· 
this Govenunent to the recognition of the authority of any indi-
vidual or faction. (Ibid., p. 625.) 
Dominican Republic, 1916.-0n January 19, 1916, the 
American l\1inister to the Do1ninican Republic tele-
graphed to the Secretary of State saying: " I think the 
Departn1ent should be prepared for probable difficulty in 
the country soon." On account of this and other infor--· 
1nation, the Secretary of State informed the Minister 
that if requested the American Govern1nent 'vould " fur-
nish the forces necessary to suppress insurrection and· 
1naintain order." (1916, Foreign Relations, U.S., -p. 
220.) The difficulty i1nplied in the Minister's telegran1, 
though a little delayed, arose, and 'var vessels were dis--
patched to Santo Domingo and other ports. In May 
1916 forces under Admiral W. B. Caperton took control 
of the city of Santo Domingo and else,vhere in order to 
take such action " as is necessary to protect United States 
forces ashore, preserve peace, lives, protection and prop-
erty of ... A .. 1nerican citizens and other foreigners and to 
constituted authority." (Ibid., p. 230.) 
Capt. H. S. Knapp, U.S.N., commander of the cruiser 
force, United States Atlantic Fleet, und~r authority of 
his GoYerninent, on November 29, 1916, declared the 
Dominican Republic to be in the state of 1nilitary occupa-
tion by forces of the United States. This proclamation 
declared the occupation to be undertaken to restore in-
. ternal order and to enable the Republic .to fulfill its 
international obligations. 
The United States Government also took over military 
control in certain parts of Haiti in 1915 and 1916 in order-· 
" to safeguard as far as possible the interests of all con--
cerned "~ as insurrectionary 1novements had prevailed for· 
some n1onths. 
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Russia, 1917.-A somewhat exceptional situation arose 
in con~quence of the revolution in Russia in 1917. This 
led some of the Allied Powers to put what amounted to 
an embargo upon shipments to Russia, though in some 
cases the embargo extended to munitions only. The 
United States took the position that it was "important 
that the impression should not be created in the minds of 
the Russian people that they have been abandoned by 
the Allies or the United States Government, and for 
that reason this Government has told the Russian repre-
.sentati ves that all shipments of supplies being manufac-
tured in this cpuntry other than munitions 'vill be per-
mitted to go forward. The question can1e up as to 
whether railway supplies were munitions and Depart-
ment told Russiap A1nbassador that licenses would be 
granted for shipment of engines and rails." (1918, For. 
Rei. U.S., 3 Rus8ia, p. 107.) 
D~pu~e bet~een Italy and Greece, 1923.-In dis-
cussing whether articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant 
could be. applied to the occupation of Corfu, M. Salandra, 
the Italian representative, read a note from his Govern-
ment on thi~ question : 
What is the Greek contention? It is that the occupation o! 
Corfu was a hostile act which may lead to a rupture dangerous 
,_for the'}Jeace --'of the world. Italy, however, has solemnly de-
clared tb:at this occupation had no hostile character-that it was 
merely -designed to assure obligations arising out of responsibil-
ity for a terrible crime. There is no danger of war. There is 
not even a suspension of diplomatic relations. • * • 
The creation of the League of Nations does not constitute a 
renunciation of States of all right to act for the defence and 
safety of their rights and their dignity. If this were so, no State 
would desire to belong to the League. (League of Nations, 
Offl~al Journal, July-December, 1923, p. 1288.) 
· After the settlement of the dispute, M. Salandra asked 
permission to present certain observations. In speaking 
-of "'peaceful occupation", he said: 
It must not be t11ought that the CoYenant of the League of 
Nations forbids these peaceful menns of repression~ They are 
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not forbidden by any of its articles. I may add that in its Pre-
amble the principles of international law are expressly recog-
nised. Among these principles is the right of peaceful reprisals 
an<l. of occupation as a measure of guarantee. .These reprisals 
are therefore legitimate. (Ibid., p. 1314.) 
In a later discussion on the interpretation of certain 
articles o£ the Covenant, Lord Robert Cecil commented 
on M. Salandra's point of view, and said: 
In the last speech that he ma(~e on the Itnlo-Greek question, 
he (:M. Salandra) undoubtedly took up the question of the legiti-
macy of reprisals in general, not only with respect to the occupa-
tion of territory but as to a great number of other reprisals ; 
be argued with great force-and I am not at all prepared to say 
that I <lisagree with him-that, until the adoption of the Cove-
nant at any rate, there was a right of reprisal or coercion--call 
it what you will-which one country might undertake in order 
tc enforce demands on another. 
In my young days, when I was more familiar with the text-
books of international law than I am now, I thfnk such actions 
used to be called measures short of war. 
Mr. Salandra also argued that the Covenant had made HO 
difference to those rights. That is an interesting argument, and, 
though it would be hypocrisy to say that the question had not 
become acute owing to recent events, yet it is a question of very 
great interest and importance for the public law of Europe at 
this moment. A great number of instances have actually oc-
<'Urred, and others have been threatened, of measures of coercion 
being applied by one State against another. I think it is of great 
importance for the Council of the League to be informed exactly 
how far these are legal nowadays under the Covenant, because 
evidently the Council may have to deal with such situations at 
any moment. . (Ibid., p. 1321.) 
Lord Robert Cecil suggested that this be· put in the 
form o£ a proposal and submitted to the Permanent 
Court o£ International Justice. He proposed: 
The existence and nature of the right of one State to enforce 
demands made upon another State by measures · of coercion and 
reprisal, and bow far, if at all, the Covenant has modified any 
such rights as between Members of the League. 
It 'vas finally decided to put certain questions before a 
Co1nmi ttee of Jurists. · 
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Questions before League of Nations, 19~3.-Certain 
questions in regard to the use of force arose in 1923 early 
in the existence of the League of Nations. These ques-
tions were referred to a Committee of Jurists consisting 
of M. Adatci (Japan), Lord Buckmaster (Great Brit-
ain), Dr. Enrique Buero (Uruguay), l\1. F. de Castello 
Branco Clark (Brazil), M. Fromageot (France), Dr. 
van Hamel (director of the legal section of the Secre-
tariat), M. Vittorio Rolandi Ricci (Italy), M. Oesten 
Unden (Sweden), Marquis de Villa Urrutia (Spain), 
and M. de Visscher (Belgium). One of these questions 
'vas: 
QUEST'ION 4 . 
.Are measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute 
acts of war consistent with the tenns of Article 12 to 15 of the 
Covenant when they are taken by one Member of the League of 
Nations against another lVIember of the League without prior re-
course to the procedure laid down in those article's? (League of 
Nations, A. 8. 1924, p. 9. Report to Fifth Asse1nbly.) 
To this question the reply "\vas not conclusive but was 
supported in the vote approving the replies as a 'vhole. 
The following was the reply to the fourth question: 
Coercive measures 'vhich are not intended to constitute acts of 
war may or may not be consistent with the provision·s of Articles 
12 to 15 of the Covenant, and it is for the Council, when the dis-
pute has been submitted to it, to decide immediately, having due 
regard to all the circumstances of the case and to the nature 
of the measures adopted, whether it ·should recommend the xnain-
tenance or the withdrawal of such 1neasures. (Ibid., p. 10.) 
1'reaty of Versailles, J,9J!J.-Some late treaties have 
contemplated the possibilities of reprisals and other 
1neasures. Even the Treaty of Versailles, which con-
tains the Covenant of the League of Nations, contains 
some such clauses. In the part of that treaty relating 
to reparations, it is said: 
17. In case of default by Gennany in the performance of any 
Gbligation under this Part of the present Treaty, the Comtnission 
will forthwith ~in~ notif'c of ~uch (lt\fault to eaeh of the inter-
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estell Powers and may make such recommendations as to the 
action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may 
think necessary. 
18. The measu1·es which the Allied and Associated Powers 
shall llUYe the right to take, in case of voluntary default b~· 
Gennan~·, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of 
wnr, may include economic and financial prohibitions and re-
prisals and in general such other measures as the respective 
Govenunents may determine to be necessary in the circumstances. 
(Part VIII, annex II, 17, 18.) 
Force has been used in th~ occupation o:f certain areas 
of Germany. 
League of Nation8 Covenant, 1920.-The Covenant of 
the League of Nations beca1ne operative by the ratifica-
tion o:f the 'rreaty o:f Versailles, January 10, 1920. The 
prea1nble of the Covenant states that: 
THE HIGH CONTRAOTING PARTIES. 
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve 
iBternationttl peace and security 
by the acce})tance of obligations not to resort to war, 
by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations be-
tween nations, 
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international 
law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and 
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all 
treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one 
another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. (1919, 
Naval " .. ar College, Int. Law Documents, p. 8.) 
League of Nations and war.-The Covenant o:f the 
League of Nations in article 16 states: 
1. Should any Men1ber of the League resort to war in disre-
gard of its coYenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso 
facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all 
other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immedi-
ately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial rela-
tions, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals 
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the pre-
vention of all financial, com1nercial or personal intercourse be-
tween the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the 
nationals of any other State, whether a Me1nber of the League of 
not. 
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2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recom-
nlend to the several Governments concerned what effective mili-
tary, naval or air force the Metnbers of the League shall severally 
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants 
of the League. 
3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they 'vill 
1nutually support one another in the financial and economic 
measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize 
the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and 
that they will n1utually support one another in resisting any 
special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-
breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to 
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the 
Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the 
covenants of the League. 
4. Any Me1nber of the League which has violated any covenant 
of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the 
League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Repre-
sentatives of all the other l\1embers of the League represented 
thereon. 
·By this article 16 a state of 'var is contetnplated in 
'vhich the forces of 1nembers of the League are to be used, 
and by article 17 a nonmember may take advantage of 
League procedure, or in ca@e the nonmember refuses 
article 16 ~may become operative, or, if both parties re-
fuse, the Council of the League "may take such measures 
and make such recom1nendations as will prevent hos-
tilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute." 
In article 11 it had been declared that " any war or 
threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the 
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a mat-
ter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations." 
League of Nations and measwres short of war.-Article 
10 and articles 12, 13, and 15 contemplate measures short 
of war but which may lead to war if League procedure 
is disregarded. Article 10 contains a positive obligation: 
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve 
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and exist-
ing political independence of all Members of the League. In case 
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of any such aggression or in case of any threat of danger of 
such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled. 
Articles 12, 13, and 15 provide for procedure in case 
of "any dispute likely to lead to rupture " prior to "re-
sort to war." The preservation of members of the 
League against aggression as contemplated in article 10-
might involve such 1neasures short of war as the Council 
may advise. 
Relations of third states.-Specific measures involving-
the use of force without declaring war have been varied 
and have often been resorted to in order to avoid war~ 
The use of force by one state against another may incon-
venience third states without involving any of the rela-
tions arising from the status of neutrality. 
Undoubtedly the Covenant of the League of Nations 
binds the members of the League to take such action as-
the League may deem wise " to safeguard the peace of' 
nations." It may be difficult in a certain case to deter-
mine the extent and exact nature of this obligation. It 
may be and has been contended that self-protection justi-
fies such acts as may be essential to the preservation of· 
a state's existence and until the League is in position to 
exercise " the enforcement by common action of interna-
tional obligations ", a state must take necessary measures 
for its immediate security without waiting the slow pro-
cesses of the League. States in becoming members of-
the League of Nations did not agree to give up their 
legitimate rights of self-defense but conceived that they 
would be more secure. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations recognizes the possibility of resort to war after 
a delay of 3 months when an award has been rendered 
by the arbitrators or a report by the Council.. There 
remain many questions in regard to the relations of third 
states when the acts of two states seem to be leading to 
measures which are not strictly pacific. 
United States Navy Regulations.-The right of self-
preservation is generally recognized both in time of peace· 
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and in tin1e of 'var. In ti1ne of war acts which 'vould 
not be regarded as la,vful in time of peace are tolerated. 
Interference with neutral trade in certain articles as in 
case of contraband, with movement of ships to specified 
__ ports as in case of blockade, and other restrictions upon 
neutral action are generally admitted to be la,vful. 
rThese are derived from the right of the belligerent to 
protect itself and to weaken its opponent. 
Even in tin1e of peace it ma.y be essential to use force. 
' 'fhe Navy Regulations of the United States state: 
1646. On occasions where injury to the United States or to 
citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the 
:principles of international law or treaty rights, the conunander in 
chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul 
of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the 
·ca·se de?lands, reporting iminediately to the Secretary of the 
Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a 
.naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer 
·thereof. 
1647. The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or 
.against anyone within the territoi'ies thereof, is illegal. The 
right of self-preservation, ho,vever, is a right 'vhich belongs to 
.States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it in-
cludes the protection of the State, its honor, ancl its possessions, 
and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary vio-
lence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may 
suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the applica-
tion of the right of self-preservation can not be defined beforehand, 
but must be left to tlH~ sound judgn1ent of responsible officers, who 
are to perfonn their duties in this respect with all possible care 
. and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in tin1e of 
peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preser-
·vation as above defined. It must be used o~ly as a last resort, 
and then only to the extent which is ~bsolutely necessary to ac-
, complish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view 
to inflicting punishment for acts already committed. 
1648. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned 
·'Principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in 
foreign territor~ on occasions of political disturbance 'vhere the 
local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life 
-and property, the assent of such authorities, or of son1e one of 
.them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice 
~to the interest involved. 
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Locarno treaties, J9t25.-The treaties relating to peace 
in Europe of October 16, 1925, con11nonly called the 
treaties of Locarno, ain1ed to give "supplementary guar-
antees 'vithin the fraine,vork of the Covenant of the 
J..Jeague of Nations, and the treaties in force between 
them." 
In the treaty of Inntual guaranty bet,Yeen Gerinany, 
Belgiun1, France, Great Britain, and Italy, these states 
by article 1 : 
<:ollectively arHl seYerally guarantee, in the mmnwr JH'OYided in 
the following Articles, the n1aintenance of the territorial status 
quo resulting fron1 the frontiers between Gennany and Belgium 
and between Germany and ]france, and the inviolability of the 
sn i<l frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace 
signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of 
the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty concern-
ing the <lemilitarised zone. (54 League of Nations, Treaty Series, 
p. 280.) 
ln article 2 : 
Gennany and Belgium, and also Gern1any and France, mutually 
undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other 
or resort to war against each otlwr. 
'fhis stipulation shall not, ho,Yever, apply in case of: 
( 1) The exercise of the right of legitin1a te defence, that is to 
Hay, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the 
previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of Articles 42 and 43 
of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an 
unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assen1bly of 
armed forces in the demilitarised zone, hn1nediate action is 
necessary ; 
(2) Action in pursuance of article 16 of the CoYenant of the 
League of Nations; 
( 3) Action as the result of a dedsion taken by the Asse1nbly 
or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of 
article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, provided that in this last event the action is directed 
against a State which was the first to attack. (Ibid., p. 293.) 
Pact of Paris, 1928.-The Pact of Paris, August 27, 
1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact), has been generally ratified 
3628-34--9 
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by the states of the "·orld, and its essential articles are 
as follows: 
ART. 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the 
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce 
it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one 
another. 
ART. 2. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement 
or solution of all disputes or conflict~ of "·ha tever nature or of 
whatever origin they may be, which may arise an1ong them, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means. 
Article I enunciates a condemnation and renunciation 
of international war. 
Article II, which is in for1n of an agreement, pro-
vides that settlement or solution of disputes among the 
parties "shall never be sought except by pacific means.'~ 
No procedure for putting this article into operation 
was provided. No provision was made for its termi-
nation or revision. Some states have therefore regarded 
the pact as another step toward assuring the continua-
tion of the status quo except as it 1nay be n1odified by 
friendly negotiation. 
There remains, however, a great difference of opinion 
as to what are "pacific means." There are those who 
argue that the pact is much weaker than article 10 and 
the :following articles of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. 
The Senate of the United States in ratifying the Pact 
of Paris recorded in the .report of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations its understanding of the effect of 
the treaty. 
The COinmittee rer)Orts the above treaty with the understanding 
that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or in1paired 
by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free 
at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend 
itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-
defense and the necessity and extent of the same. 
The Unit~d States regards the l\fonroe doctrine as a part of 
its national security and defense. (70 Con. Rec., Jan. 15, 1929, 
p. 1730.) 
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0 ollective action.-The proposals for collective action 
for the maintenance of peace or for the carrying out of 
an agreed policy has been common among states. The 
doctrine of balance of power and the concert of powers 
in Europe modified the course of action of European 
powers and the distribution of the spoils of war. Al-
liances usually ostensibly for the maintenance of peace 
often sought the establishment of the status quo. Alli-
ances and ententes frequently equalized opposing groups 
to a degree which made the risk of disturbing the peace 
greater than any party cared to assume. 
Some of the resultant co1nbinations have put forth. 
doctrines of broad scope, while others have proposed. 
regional policies. The division on the basis of " Great 
Powers " and " Minor Powers " has been fundamental in. 
some of the acts of European states. The contentions: 
which let! to a more general recognition of the idea of' 
equality of states made some new basis of collective ac--
tion essential. This was realized at the close of the 
World War in 1918 and the Covenant of the. League of 
Nations in part embodied the then existing aspirations 
for collective action by the states of the 'vorld. 
Early United States action.-The Articles of Confed-
eration of the United States, 1778, provided for common 
action as in article III : 
The said states hereby severally enter into n firm league of 
friendship with each other, for their common defencel the security 
of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding 
themselves to assist each othee, against Rll force offered to, or 
attacks made upon them or any of them, on account of religion, 
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever. 
Article XIII provided further :for observance of the 
articles. 
Every state shall abide by the determinations of the united 
states in congress assembled, on all que~tions which by this con-
federation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this 
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and tbe 
union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time 
hereafter be made· in any of them; unless such alteration be 
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agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards 
confirmed by the legislatures of every state. 
Realizing that the lack of specified means fot carrying 
vut the provisions of article XIII might give rise to 
difficulties, the matter was considered and a form of 
action somewhat similar to that proposed in the League 
of Nations' Covenant was set forth for application in 
case of a state that had failed to observe article XIII: 
the said United States in Congress assembled are fully author-
ized to employ the force of the United States as well by sea as 
by land to compel such State or States to fulfill their federal 
engagements, and particularly to make distraint on any of the 
effects vessels and merchandizes of such State or States or of 
any of the Citizens thereof wherever found and to prohibit and 
prevent their trade and intercourse as well with any other of the 
United States and the Citizens thereof, as with any foreign State, 
and as well by land as by sea until full compensation or compli-
ance be obtained with respect to all requisitions made by the 
United States in Congress assembled in pursuance of the Articles 
of Confederation. (20 Jour. Cont. Cong., Hunt ed., p. 470.) 
Constitutional provi8ions of the United St(J)tes.-Article 
1 of the Constitution of the United States, section 8, 
states that Congress shall have power to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare of the United States 
and " to regulate commerce 'vith foreign nations." 
Under the constitutional powers an act of Congress, 
June 13, 1798 ( 1 U. S. Stat. 565), suspended commercial 
intercourse bet,veen the United States and France. 
British-Swedish concert, 1813-1.4.-By the treaty of ~ 
March 3, 1813, Great Britain agreed to cooperate with 
Sweden " for the maintenance of the independence of 
the North " and in article II, it was stated: 
. 
tbat His Britannic Majesty will not only not oppose any obstacle 
to the annexation and union in perpetuity of the l{ingdom of 
Norway as an integral part to the Kingdom of Sweden, but also 
will assist the views of His lVIajesty the King of Sweden to that 
effect, either by his good offices, or by employing, if it should be 
necessary, his naval co-operation in concert with the Swedish or 
Hussian forces. (1 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 298.) 
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The Swedish-Russian treaties of April 5 and June 15, 
also promised Russia both diplomatic and milita.ry aid. 
Prussia also agrees to aid Sweden by a separate and 
secret article, April 22, 1813. 
The British blockade of the ports of Norway \Yas 
notified on April 29, 1814. The Foreign Office announce-
Inent w·as as follo\vs: 
Earl Bathurst, one of His 1\Iajesty's Principal Secretaries of 
State, has this day notified, by command of His Royal Highness 
the Prince Regent, to the l\Iinisters of Friendly Powers resident 
at this court, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, that 
the necessary 1neasures ba ve been taken by coinmand of His 
Royal Highness, for the Blockade of the Ports of Norway, and 
that from this time 'all the measures authorized by the Law of 
Nations will be a_dopted and executed with respect to all Vessels 
which may attempt to violate the said Blockade. (Ibid., p. 1277.) 
This blockade was raised under the following notice 
issued September 3, 1814: 
Earl Bathurst, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of 
State, bas this day notified, by command of His Royal Highness 
the Prince Regent, to the Ministers of Friendly Powers resident 
at this Court that the necessary orders will forthwith be issued 
to the Officer commanding His Majesty's Ships and Vessels em-
ployed in the Blockade of the Coast of Norway, to discontinue 
the said Blockade. (Ibid., p. 1277.) 
United action.-While the United States has generally 
refrained from agreeing in advance to act together with 
the military forces of other powers, yet it has at times 
expressed willingness to cooperate. Prince Bis1narck in 
1870 raised question as to " whether it would not be for 
the common interest of the powers engaged in the China 
trade to inaugurate a plan of combined action, to be 
settled by previous arrangement between the various gov-
ernments, or between the commanders of the several 
squadrons." (1870, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 330.) 
The· British Government gave orders for cooperation of 
its naval forces in combined measures and later Secre-
tary Fish replied to the Minister of the North German 
Union as follows: 
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
Washington, !Jfarch 31, 1870. 
SIR : Referring to your notes of the 19th and 25th of February 
last, and ()f the 28th of March current, concerning a proposed 
combined action of the naval forces of the United s·tates and of 
North Germany for the suppression of piracy in the Chinese 
waters, I have now the honor to inform you that the President 
11as taken great pleasure in complying with the request of Count 
Bis1narck, by dire<!ting instructions to be issued from the Navy 
Departlnent to Achniral Rogers, to cooperate for that purpose 
with .. the naval forces of the North Germany and such other 
powers as shall receive similar instructions. 
The cooperation of Adiniral Rogers and of the forces under 
his coininand will, however, be limited to cases of recognized 
piracy. He will be instructed to proceed in such a way as not 
to wound the sensibilities of the Chinese government, or to 
interfere with the lawful commerce of the Chinese subjects, or to 
conflict Yvith the peaceful policy toward China in which the gov-
ernment of North Gern1any and the United States so happily 
agree. 
I a vail 1nyself of this opportunity to renew the assurances 
of 1ny distinguished consideration. 
HAMILTON FISH. 
(Ibid., p. 331.) 
0 oope1·at/on on slave trade.-The United States has 
from time to time agreed to cooperate 'vith other states 
in the use of force. The suppression of the slave trade 
'vas a ground for such action as provided in the treaty 
of 1842 with Great Britain: 
ARTICLE VIII. The parties 1nutually ·stipulate that each shall 
prepare, equip, and 1naintain in service on the coast of Africa a 
sufficient and adequate squadron or naval force of vessels of suit-
able numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty 
guns, to enforce separately and r·espectively, the laws, rights, and 
obligations of each of the two countries for the suppre·ssion of 
the slave-trade, the said squadrons to be independent of each 
other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give 
such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces as 
shall enable t1Ien1 1nost effectively to act in concert and coopera-
tion, :upon mutual consultation, as ~xigencies may arise, for the 
attainment of the tru~ object of t~1is article, copies of all such 
orders to be cominunicated by each Government to the other, 
respective])·. ( 8 U.S. Stat., p. 572.) 
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Detailed provisions for rendering this cooperation 
tnore effective were embodied in the treaty of 1862. A 
restricted right of search and detention in specified areas 
\Vas reciprocally allowed and 1nixed courts for adjudica-
tion \Vere established. The convention of 1870 provided 
for the discontinuance of the courts. 
1"'he general act signed at Brussels, July 2, 1890, by 
17 states unified to a considerable extent the pre vi-
ous conventions relating to the slave trade and at the 
-same time increased the nun1ber of states authorized to 
act as regards one another for the suppression of the 
traffic. A sort of clearing house was to be set up as an 
international office at Zanzibar. By this convention the 
scope of right of com1non action of the signatory states 
was much enlarged. 
0 olombia, 1885.-ln 1884--85 there w-as an " unsettled 
state of affairs " in Colombia and owing to the " dis-
ordered condition of society" and the anticipated " dis-
regard of the rights of foreigners on the coast and 
Isthmus," the American n1inister requested the presence 
of an "American man-of-war." Early in 1885 communi-
cation with the American minister \vas cut off by the dis-
turbed conditions and the naval officer at Pan:una \vas 
obliged to act \vithout con1n1unication vYith the cliplo-
Inatic representative at Bogota. During the period of 
"disordered conditions", the forces of the United States 
took positive measures to protect the rights of An1erican 
citizens. 
Bo.r;er uprising in China, 1900.-During the Boxer 
uprising in China in 1900 the United States 1naintained 
so far as possible a policy of independent action, though 
cooperating ''ith the other Po\vers \Vhen it seen1ed essen-
tial. Regarding the sending by Mr. Conger, United 
States Minister to China, of an identic note to the 
Chinese Foreign Office, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, 
'vrote on March 22 : 
Iu c'Onnection 'Yith the identic note agreed upon with your 
.colleagues of France, Germany, and Great Britain, and sent by you 
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to the yamen on January 21 (inclosure 3, dispatch No. 316),. 
.. 
'vhile the Department finds no objection to the general terms of 
this paper [demanding publication of strong imperial decree 
without delay], it would have preferred if you had made separate-
representation on the question instead of the n1ode adopted, as. 
the position of the United States in relation to China .makes it 
expedient, that, while circu1nstances may sometimes require that 
it act on lines similar to those other tt·eaty powers follow, it 
should do :-:;o singly and without the cooperation of other powers .. 
(1900, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 111.) 
On June 7, however, Mr. Conger co1n1nunicated with 
Mr. Hay w·ith regard to whether he should join the diplo--
Inatic corps if this body found it " necessary to demand 
special audience 'vith En1peror ", Mr. Hay replied: 
Act independently in protection of American interests where· 
practicable, and concurrently with representatives of other powers 
if necessity arise. (Ibid., p. 142--43.) 
Mr. Conger on June 8 again suggested that he join the· 
diplomatic corps in den1.anding "an audience with 
Emperor, the demand to be insisted upon, and to state· 
to the Throne that unless Boxer war is immediately sup-
pressed and order restored foreign powers will be com-
pelled themselves to take 1neasures to that end." To this 
suggestion Mr. Hay's reply was "Yes", but in a sup-
pleinentary 1nessage the following day he added, 
'Ye have no policy in China exC'ept to protect with energy 
A1nerican interests, and especially An1erican citizens and the lega-
tion. There n1ust be nothing done which would conuuit us to 
future action inconsistent with your standing instructione. There· 
1nust be no alliances. (Ibid.) 
On July 3, in order to place before the world the position 
of the United States in regard to the restoration of order-
in China, Mr. Hay sent the following circular telegram 
to United States representatives in the legations of the· 
principal powers with the instructions that the purport 
of this statement be comn1unicated to the 1ninister for-
foreign affairs. This telegram read: 
In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropri-
ate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present 
ACTION IN CHINA 131 
eircumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy 
initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, of 
furtherance of lawful comtnerce, and of protection of lives and 
property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extrater-
ritorial rights and by the law of nations. * * * The purpose 
of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently 
with the other powers, first, in opening up communication with 
Pekin and rescuing An1erican officials, missionaries, and other 
Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible 
protection everywhere in China to American life and property; 
thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legithuate American inter-
ests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders 
to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such 
·disasters. * * * (Ibid., p. 299.) 
On the same day; Mr. Hay communicated to the French 
Charge d'Affaires in Washington that" instructions have 
been telegraphed to the commander of the United States 
naval :forces in Chi'nese \Vaters to confer \vith his col-
leagues and report as to the :force necessary to accomplish 
the ends now purposed and the proportionate :force to 
be appropriately employed by the United States :for their 
attainment in the general interest of the powers con-
cerned." This was in response to the request of the 
French Government that there be a " concert of the 
po\vers, with a view to sending identical instructions to 
the commanding officers of their respective :forces in the 
Pechili. * * * " (Ibid., pp. 318-319.) 
Later in the same month the French Government, 
through the Charge in_ Washington, suggested in a mem-
·orandum to the United States that "the Government o:f 
the Republic is disposed to confer with the powers in 
the precautions to be taken to prevent the shipment o:f 
arms which should be destined :for China." A memo-
randum o:f the same date, July 20, 1900, issued by the 
Department o:f State indicates that the Secretary o:f 
State had given orders to the officers in the various de-
partments concerned " to exercise the utinost vigilance 
to prevent the dispatch or the landing in China of any 
arms destined for improper use in that country. and had 
given direct orders to the consuls of the United States 
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in China to do all in their power in the same direction." 
(Ibid., p. 319.) 
In August conditions in China being in no \vay iin-
proved, it was suggested to the United States through 
its Embassy, that the Gern1an Government \Vould like 
to know the vie,vs of the United States Government in 
regard to placing the An1erican forces under the chief 
com1nand of Field Marshal Count V\T aldersee in Chihli, 
and it was stated that Japan and Russia had already 
agreed to such an arra.nge1nent. The n1e1norandum of 
the Department of State on this matter was transmitted 
to the German Foreign Office on August 10. It read: 
The Government of the United States will be 1nuch gratified 
to secure the cmnmand of so distinguished and experienced an 
officer as Count '\Valdersee for any combined military operations 
in which the American troops take part after the arrival of that 
officer in China to attain the purposes declared by this Govern-
ment in the circular note delivered to the powers under date of 
.July 3. 
The general cmnmanding the A1nerican forces in China has 
already been authorized to agree with other con1manders as to 
a con1mon official direction of the various forces in their com-
bined operations, preserving the integrity of his American division 
as a separate organization. A copy of this communication will be 
transmitted to him. 
As a considerable tin1e must elapse before Count '\Valdersee· 
can reach China and conditions are rapidly changing, it would 
seem desirable to lea Ye questions of method to be determined in 
Yie\v of the conditions which 1nay then exist. The suggestion 
of His l\1ajest~· the Gern1an Emperor that one or n1ore military 
officers of each nationality should be attached to the headquarters 
of Count "\Valdersee to maintain communications with the national 
contingent meets the approval of this Government. (Ibid.,. 
p. 331.) 
Swedish p1"oposition, 1916.-In 1916 the s,vedish Min-
ister in London made lmo,vn in a 1nen1orandum to 
Colonel House the Swedish desire for-
An effective collaboration with other neutral powers in view 
of conYentional a-nd idealistic interests. The GoYernn1ei1t, who 
are sincerely pacific, have been compelled to recognize that the 
difficulties must increase with the extension of the· fight, and 
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that the possibilities for neutral interests to assert themselves 
evidently decrease il) the sam~ proportion as the circle of neutrals 
becomes narrowed clown through the entry in the struggle of new 
powers. 
The Government are convinced that it would prove a great 
and irreparable damage if the voice of neutrals could not make 
itself heard with sufficient weight. With regard to this, the 
Government do not only think of the difficulties and losses in-
flicted upon one or the other of neutral countries through undue 
i11terference from the belligerents, inconveniences which might 
have been avoided through a unanimous action of the interested 
neutral states. 
The Swedish Government consider it as the precious duty and 
the inalienable right of all sincerely neutral countries to inter-
vene with impartiality and firmness against every atten1pt, 
whenceever they come, to render non-valid and void international 
rules, which are the fruit of centuries of experience and work. 
By preserving the inheritance of the law of nations, a service is 
indeed also rendered to the belligerents themselves, who under 
altered circumstances may one day have bitterly to regret-also 
from practical point of view-the actions in which they now 
allow themselves to indulge in order to gain a casual and often 
doubtful advantage. (1916, Foreign Relations, U. S. Supplement 
part II, p. 689.) 
s,veden had in 1914 joined with Denmark and Norway 
in an identic note (1914 Id., supple1nent, p. 360), with 
which the Nether lands agreed, addressed to the German, 
French, British, and Russian ministers and protesting 
against the infringement of the rights of neutrals, and 
upholding the inviolability of the funda1nental rules of 
international law. 
A later communication in a circular telegram to the 
American diplomatic officers in Europe stated that it 'vas 
considered inadvisable by the Americ.an Govern1nent to 
participate in a conference of neutrals. The geograph-
ical remoteness, the failure to include other American 
republics in the invitation, and the policy of independent 
action, were given as reasons for the decision. 
Defence and, restraint.-ln some forn1 physical re-
straint upon the action of man against 1nan has been 
con1mon from earliest times. The delegation to special 
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persons of the exercise of this restraint upon the action 
of one 1nan or a group of men against another man or 
group of men has gradually grown up as men have united 
in larger and more unified groups. While at certain 
stages of civilization, the group itself might 1nobilize for 
defense as in early Americ.a.n settlements, at other stages 
as in modern European states special classes are trained 
to defend the group with highly technical means. It 
seemed but a natural development fro1n national to inter-
national defense or restraint. International guaranties 
of security 'vere proposed and sometimes embodied in 
agreements or treaties. The experience of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century has not confirmed the 
one ti1ne belief in the efficacy of such methods. 
As states assumed the protection of those subject to 
their authority, various measures were resorted to to 
assure the respect for this protection and for the rights 
claimed for their subjects. Reprisals in some for1n were 
approved a1nong early states and quite fully developed 
in Roman practice and during the Middle Ages. Letters 
of marque and reprisal and pri vateering gave evidence of 
the survival of early methods. Sequestration of public 
or private property of an offending state or of its ·- na-
tionals, breaking off of official or other relations, expulsion 
or arrest of nationals, occupation of ports or territory of 
the offending state, or other measures might be taken in 
time of strained relations between states. Embargo and 
nonintercourse acts did put a degree of restraint upon 
offenders but not always to the anticipated degree. 
Pacific blockade, retorsion, and other measures short of 
'var 'vere fron1 tilne to ti1ne tried with varying degree of 
success. The belief became more and more general in 
the twentieth century, particularly after the Hague Con-
ference of 1899, that concerted action and international 
agreements would assure an orderly world. 
Severally and jointly.-When a group has agreed sev-
erally and jointly not 1nerely is the group under obliga-
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tion to act to secure the end for which the agreement 
is made, but each member is under an independent obli-
gation to act. There is no.t the same obligation to act, 
ho·wever, when a state ·simply declares its intention to 
act in a certain manner or to follow a named policy, for 
its policy may from time to time change as probably 
was the case when it made the declaration. A declara-
tion, being unilateral, .rests upon the state making the 
declaration, and the use of its forces will depend upon 
the conditions under which the declaration is made. An 
agreement, however, has a binding :force 'vhich implies 
that other powers as well as the parties to the agreement 
may expect the terms of the agreement to be fulfilled, 
though, of course, the agreement does not make unlawful 
action lawful. Even if many states make identic decla-
rations, this fact does not prevent one of the states from 
renouncing the position taken in the declaration. 
As states A, B, and C have severally and jointly agreed 
to the boycott of X and Y, the action of one in the boy-
cott is the action of all. The action of each should there-
fore be that which would most effectively realize the 
ends for which the boycott 'vas undertaken. The ports 
of each should be open, so far as the conduct of the boy-
cott is concerned, on the sa1ne terms to vessels of all and 
the conduct of port authorities and other officials should 
as regards the boycott be similar. 
)SOLUTION III 
(a) I'he A jaw should determine for what port the 
Banner is bound, and if for a port of X or if uncertain, 
should send the Banner to the nearest port of A , B, or C. 
If the B mnner had sailed before the boycott was pro-
tlaimed, the Banner should be notified of the boycott and 
should be prohibited from entering any port of X. 
The Brook should act in the same manner unless for 
special reasons the Banner should be· sent to a port of B. 
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(b) The Crown should take such action as 'vould make 
certain that the merchant vessel of X goes to a port of 
B or some port of A or C. 
( o) The Crown, if assured of the nationality of the 
Drone," may take no action though the Drone may be kept 
from entering ports of X which are effectively closed. 
(d) Merchant· vessels of X or D, E, and F bound out 
:from X under convoy of vessel of war of X are. free to 
proceed but when bound for X the cruisers of states A, 
B and C may take action to prevent entrance of the 
vessels· to ports which are effectively closed and may 
l'oute or take vessels of X bound for X to ports of A, 
B, and C. · 
